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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Ann. sec. 78A-3-102(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court err in granting Appellees' motion to dismiss the HOA's 
negligence, negligence per se, negligent misrepresentation, and nuisance 
claims based on the economic loss rule? 
Standard of Review: A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss "presents a 
question of law that [this Court] reviews for correctness.'' 
Ellis v. Estate of Steven Wade Ellis, 2007 UT 77, \ 6, 169 
P.3d 441 (Utah 2007). Moreover, the district court's 
"interpretation of prior precedent, statutes, and the common 
law are questions of law that [this Court] review[s] for 
correctness." Id. 
Preservation for Appeal: R. at 171-76; 660-58. 
ISSUE 2: Did the trial court err in granting Appellees' motion to dismiss the HOA's 
contract- and express warranty-based claims based on the merger doctrine? 
Standard of Review: A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss "presents a 
question of law that [this Court] reviews for correctness." 
Ellis v. Estate of Steven Wade Ellis, 2007 UT 77, % 6, 169 
P.3d 441 (Utah 2007). Moreover, the district court's 
"interpretation of prior precedent, statutes, and the common 
law are questions of law that [this Court] review[s] for 
correctness." Id. 
Preservation for Appeal: R. at 99-102. 
ISSUE 3: Did the trial court err in granting Appellees5 motion to dismiss the HOA's 
implied warranty claim? 
Standard of Review: A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss ''presents a 
question of law that [this Court] reviews for correctness." 
Ellis v. Estate of Steven Wade Ellis, 2007 UT 77, % 6, 169 
P.3d 441 (Utah 2007). Moreover, the district court's 
"interpretation of prior precedent, statutes, and the common 
law are questions of law that [this Court] reviewfs] for 
correctness." Id. 
Preservation for Appeal: R. at 92-96. 
ISSUE 4: Did the trial court err in denying the HOA's motion to amend its Complaint 
to add claims related to alleged soil subsidence? 
Standard of Review: "Whether to grant or deny a motion to amend is a matter 
within the broad discretion of the trial court and [this Court] 
[will not] disturb its ruling unless [the appealing party] 
establishes an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice." 
Pride Stables, LP v. Homestead Golf Club, Inc., 2003 UT 
App 41L 111, 82 P.3d 198 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (citation 
2 
and quotations omitted) (second and third alterations in 
original). 
Preservation for Appeal: R. at 658-60. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann, sec. 78B-4-513: Cause of Action for Defective Construction 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), an action for defective design or 
construction is limited to breach of the contract, whether written or otherwise, including 
both express and implied warranties. 
(2) An action for defective design or construction may include damage to other 
property or physical personal injury if the damage or injury is caused by the defective 
design or construction. 
(3) For purposes of Subsection (2)5 properly7 damage does not include: 
(a) the failure of construction to function as designed; or 
(b) diminution of the value of the constructed property because of the 
defective design or construction. 
(4) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (6), an action for defective design or 
construction may be brought only by a person in privity of contract with the original 
contractor, architect, engineer, or the real estate developer. 
(5) If a person in privity of contract sues for defective design or construction under 
this section, nothing in this section precludes the person from bringing, in the same suit, 
another cause of action to which the person is entitled based on an intentional or willful 
breach of a duty existing in law. 
(6) Nothing in this section precludes a person from assigning a right under a 
contract to another person, including to a subsequent owner or a homeowners association. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The HOA filed suit on April 10, 2006 against Davencourt Woolstenhulme, Parry 
Construction, and Does asserting fifteen causes of action. (R. at 1-45.) 
IJNO. 
I 
2 
3 
4 
1 5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
CLAIM 
Negligence 
Negligent misrepresentation 
Nuisance 
Misrepresentation and nondisclosure 
Breach of fiduciary duties 
Breach of contract 
Breach of express and implied 
warranties 
Negligence 
Negligent misrepresentation 
Misrepresentation and nondisclosure 
Breach of fiduciary duties 
Negligence per se 
Breach of contract—third party 
beneficiary 
Breach of contract—third party 
beneficiary 
Equitable subrogation 
AGAINST "; 
Davencourt 
Woolstenhulme 
Party Construction 
Davencourt 
Woolstenhulme 
Davencourt 
Woolstenhulme 
Party Construction 
Davencourt 
Woolstenhulme 
Davencourt 
Woolstenhulme 
Davencourt 
Davencourt 
Does 
Does 
Does 
Does 
Davencourt 
Woolstenhulme 
Parry Construction 
Does 
Davencourt 
Parry Construction 
Does 
Davencourt 
Woolstenhulme 
Parry Construction 
Does 
iHHtiHfl&J 
R, at 7-10 
R. at 10-14 
R. at 14 
R. at 14-17 
R. at 17-21 
R. at 21-23 
R.. at 23-24 j 
R. at 24-26 
R. at 27-30 
R. at 30-33 
R. at 33-36 
R. at 36-37 
R. at 37-40 
R. at 40-42 
R. at 42-42 
On May 16, 2006. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss various causes of action in 
the Complaint. (R. at 54-76.) The trial court granted in part and denied in part 
4 
Appellees' motion. (R. at 164.) The court dismissed six of the HOA's claims 
(highlighted in the table above): the first (negligence), second (negligent 
misrepresentation), third (nuisance), sixth (breach of contract), seventh (breach of express 
and implied warranties), and twelfth (negligence per se) causes of action, leaving nine 
remaining claims.1 (R. at 164-77.) 
On April 26, 2007, almost a year after Appellees' motion to dismiss, the HOA 
filed a motion to amend its Complaint and to reinstate the dismissed claims (or, in the 
alternative, for interlocutory certification and for a motion to stay the proceedings). R. at 
200-12.) The HOA based its motion on "new Utah case law," although the '"new5" case 
law—Hermansen v. Tasulis. 2002 UT 52, 48 P.3d 235(Utah 2002), Smith v. Frandsen. 
2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919 (Utah 2004), and Yazdv. Yousefu 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283 
(Utah 2006)—was years old. (R. at 200-12.) The trial court denied the HOArs motion to 
amend its Complaint (except to name the Does), and instead, granted the interlocutory 
certification and the motion to stay. (R. at 656-67.) 
The HOA filed its Notice of Appeal on November 7, 2007. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Davencourt at Pilgrim's Landing ("Development") is a planned community of 145 
townhomes in Lehi, Utah. (R. at 1-2.) Davencourt began construction on the 
Though the trial court apparently relied solely upon the economic loss rule to 
dismiss all of the HOA's negligence-based claims (r. at 165-70, 174), Appellees also 
argued in their memorandum that the HOA could not satisfy the prima facie elements of a 
nuisance claim (r. at 71-72). 
5 
Development in the spring of 1998. (R. at 2-3.) On December 3, 1998, Woolstenhulme2 
caused the Declaration of Easements, Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (which 
included bylaws and miscellaneous provisions for the Development) (collectively "the 
CC&Rs") to be recorded with the Utah County Recorder. (R. at 2.) Among other things, 
the CC&Rs created the HOA. (R. at 2-3.) 
In approximately October 1999, Davencourt contracted with Parry Construction, a 
licensed general contractor, to act as the general contractor for the development. (R. at 
3.) The contracts between Davencourt and Parry Construction do not contain any 
language or term that confers a third-party benefit or right upon the HOA. 
Parry Construction was responsible for and in charge of building the development. 
(R. at 3-4.) It employed and supervised all subcontractors and labor for the construction, 
operation, and maintenance of Davencourt. (R. at 4.) Woolstenhulme and Davencourt 
did not take part in constructing the development. (R. at 3-4.) When Parr}7 Construction 
completed the units, Davencourt sold the units to individual purchasers. (R. at 4.) 
Years later, some of the owners reported water leaks in their units."3 (R. at 5.) The 
HOA then sued Defendants/Appellees for, among others, negligence, breach of contract, 
and breach of implied warranties. (R. at 1-45.) 
~ Woolstenhulme was the registered agent for and a member of Davencourt. a 
Utah limited liability corporation. (R. at 3.) 
J
 In its brief (particularly its "facts" section), the HOA cited its proposed Amended 
Complaint (r. at 213-95) as evidence that Davencourt, Woolstenhulme. and Parr}7 
Construction performed a "geotechnical study" and that there was "land subsidence" due 
to "collapsible soils" in the development. (Appellant's Br. 6-7.) But the HOA's 
Amended Complaint is not part of the record because the trial court denied the HOA's 
motion to amend it complaint. (R. at 663-65.) Therefore, the Amended Complaint 
6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
With this case, the HOA asks the Court to eviscerate the economic loss rule as 
promulgated by this Court in American Towers and recently codified by the Utah 
Legislature. The Court should refrain from taking that drastic step. 
The economic loss rule has been settled law in Utah (particularly in the 
construction defect context) since American Towers twelve years ago. Moreover. Utah 
has consistently applied the rule since American Towers, even as recently as 2006. And 
although this Court adopted a general statement of law from the Colorado Supreme Court 
concerning the economic loss rule. Utah's jurisprudence and legislative history are a 
"photographic negative" of Colorado's, making Colorado's application of the rule in 
construction defect cases of little value in Utah. 
The economic loss rule precludes recovery unless there is damage to "other 
property." which does not include damage to the development itself. The HOA's damage 
is not to "other property." but to the units and the development itself. Therefore, the 
HOA cannot escape the rule under the "other property" exception. 
The HOA urges this Court to create independent duties that Appellees \A ould owe 
to the HOA. thereby escaping the grasp of the economic loss rule. The limited 
"independent duty" cases of Hermansen and West are not analogous to this case, and 
other construction defect cases, like Yazd and Smith, are equally inapposite and do not 
support this Court creating exceptions to the economic loss rule. 
cannot serve as the basis for any allegations inconsistent with the HOA's original 
Complaint. 
7 
In addition, after extensive debate and consideration, the Utah Legislature recently 
codified the economic loss rule, evidencing the public's desire to retain the rule. The 
Court should defer to the legislative branch and respect its right to speak to matters of 
public policy. 
The HOA has not met its substantial burden to overcome stare decisis by 
overruling American Towers. The Court found the economic loss rule persuasive in 
1996, and it is equally persuasive today. 
The trial court correctly barred the HOA's breach of contract and express warranty 
claims because the merger doctrine bars claims that arise out of contracts that have 
merged with a warranty deed. 
Moreover, the trial court properly dismissed the HOA's implied warranty claims 
because no such warranty exists in Utah. And finally, the court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the HOA's motion to amend its complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE HOA'S TORT 
CLAIMS BASED ON THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE. 
First, the HOA argued that the trial court incorrectly relied on the economic loss 
rule and American Towers in dismissing the HOA's tort-based claims.4 According to the 
HOA. the economic loss rule should not bar its negligence claims for two reasons: "(1) 
the damage the [HOA] is complaining of is property damage, not purely economic loss," 
4
 Specifically, the HOA argued that the trial court mistakenly relied on the 
economic loss rule in dismissing the HOA's first (negligence), second (negligent 
misrepresentation), third (nuisance), and twelfth (negligence per se) claims. 
8 
and "(2) [Davencourt and Parry Construction] owed independent duties to the [HOA] and 
[its] owners/' (Appellant's Br. 10-11.) 
The HOA's arguments ignore several facts. First this case is the biological twin 
to American Towers—which has never been overruled—and it squarely falls under that 
case. 
Second the HOA's definition of "damage" is a distinction without a difference. 
Under the economic loss rule, the HOA cannot recover "economic losses" under a theory 
of non-intentional tort. Am. Towers Assoc, Inc. v. CCI Meek, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1189 
(Utah 1996). "Economic losses" are defined as damages or costs of repair/replacement of 
the defective product without claim of personal injury or damage to "other property." Id. 
Damage to the units themselves is not damage to "other property/" and therefore, the rule 
prevents the HOA from asserting non-intentional negligence claims against Davencourt. 
Woolstenhulme. and Parry Construction. 
Third. Davencourt and Parry Construction do not owe independent duties to the 
HOA. and no Utah appellate case holds (or trends) otherwise. 
Moreover, in its 2008 general session, the Utah Legislature passed Senate Bill 
220. "Cause of Action for Defective Construction." which codified the economic loss 
rule as promulgated by this Court in American Towers. This evidences the public's 
desire and intent, through their elected officials, to retain the economic loss rule in the 
context of homeowners' associations. Further, although never previously prohibited, the 
new law specifically provides that a developer may assign any contractual rights to the 
homeowners* association. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-513(6). Such an assignment would 
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allow a homeowners' association to sue a builder for breach of contract, thereby 
protecting an association's right to recover for construction defects that might otherwise 
be barred by the economic loss rule. 
Finally, the economic loss rule is good public policy, and it has been settled law in 
UtahD in the construction defect context for at least twelve years. Countless parties and 
courts have relied on the doctrine for litigation strategy and as the basis for dispositive 
rulings. Parties have organized their business affairs—including insurance, contracts, 
and risk avoidance—based on the law established in American Towers. The HOA would 
have this Court ignore stare decisis. Stare decisis, however, is a weighty command that 
should not be cavalierly discarded. 
Each of these points will be addressed in turn, beginning with an explanation of 
the economic loss rule and its history in Utah. 
A. The Economic Loss Rule. 
1. Generally. 
The economic loss rule provides that "one may not recover 'economic* losses 
D
 The majority of jurisdictions apply the economic loss rule in some fashion. 
Several have not yet had the opportunity to address the rule in the construction defect 
setting, but most of those that have apply the rule to bar a homeowner from recovering 
against third parties with whom the owner did not have a contract. E.g., Aas v. Superior 
Court of San Diego County, 12 P.3d 1125 (Cal. 2000): Casa Clara Condominium Ass %n< 
Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993); Ocean Ritz of 
Daytona Condominium v. GGVAssocs., Ltd., 710 So. 2d 702 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); 
Berish v. Bornstein, 770 N.E.2d 961 (Mass. 2002); Tarrant County Hosp. District 
Appellant v. GE Automation Sen's, Inc.. 156 S.W.3d 885 (Tex. App. 2005); Rotonda 
Condo. Unit Owners Ass >? v. Rotonda Assocs.. 380 S.E.2d 876 (Va. 1989); Armfield 
Homeowners' Assw? v. Coscan Washington, Inc., 26 Va. Cir. 65 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1991); 
Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 896 (Wash. 1994). 
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under a theory of non-intentional tort." Am. Towers Assoc, Inc. v. CCIMech., Inc., 930 
P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah 1996). More precisely, economic damages—defined as 
"[d]amages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective 
product, or consequent loss of profits"—are not recoverable in negligence absent physical 
property damage or bodily injury. Id. When a case involves negligence in building 
construction, the damage to the building itself is not considered damage to property. Id. 
at 1190-91. The economic loss rule, however, is not a bar to a negligence claim that is 
based on an independent duty. This Court has applied this "independent duty" exception 
only once, mHermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, ffif 13-23, 48 P.3d 235 (Utah 2002) 
(exempting real estate brokers and agents from the economic loss rule because they "owe 
a duty, independent of any implied or express contracts, to be 'honest, ethical, and 
competent' in [their] relationship with [their clients]").6 
The economic loss rule "marks the fundamental boundary between contract law, 
which protects expectancy interests created through agreement between the parties, and 
tort law, which protects individuals and their property from physical harm by imposing a 
duty of reasonable care." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, % 13, 48 P.3d 235 (Utah 
2002). In other words, where a party enters into a contract, contract law (not tort law) 
governs "the bargained-for duties and liabilities" of those who exercised their freedom of 
contract. Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, *h 41, 70 P.3d 1 (Utah 2003). 
6
 As a logical and limited extension of this Court's decision in Hermansen, in 
2006, the Utah Court of Appeals created an exception to the economic loss rule for real 
estate appraisers in West v. Inter-Financial, Inc., 2006 UT App 222, 139 P.3d 1059 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2006). 
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And where no contract governs parties' duties and liabilities (i.e., "non-consenting 
members of society"), tort law governs. Id. 
The roots of the economic loss rule lie in products liability cases where there is no 
physical injury, thus putting a limitation on damages. Hermansen, 2002 UT 52, •[j 13. 
But the "rationales underlying the doctrine are particularly applicable in the construction 
setting" because "construction projects are characterized by detailed and comprehensive 
contracts that fonn the foundation of the industry's operations." Id. \ 13 (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
The threshold question "in cases where the line between contract and tort blurs is 
whether a duty exists independent of any contractual obligations between the parties." 
Id. U 17. If an independent duty does exist, the rule "does not bar a tort claim because the 
claim is based on a recognized independent duty of care and thus does not fall within the 
scope of the rule." Id. (citation and quotations omitted). 
2. History of the economic loss rule in Utah. 
Beginning in 1996 with American Towers, seven cases establish the economic loss 
rule as settled, well-defined Utah lawr. 
a. Am. Towers v. CCIMeck, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996). 
This Court first applied the economic loss rule in the construction defect context in 
19967 in Am. Towers v. CCIMeck, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996), the facts of which 
7
 Two years earlier, in 1994, the Utah Court of Appeals decided Maack v. 
Resource Design & Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), and Schafir v. 
Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In both cases, the court applied the 
12 
are nearly identical to this case. In American Towers, the homeowners' association 
maintained two 26-story towers containing 357 residential units and some commercial 
space. Id. at 1187. The association sued the developers and builders for unjust 
enrichment, breach of contract/warranty (third party-beneficiary), negligence, and breach 
of implied warranty. Id. at 1184. This Court held that the economic loss rule barred the 
association's negligence claim because the association was trying to recover purely 
economic damages. Id. at 1188-92. 
b. SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & 
Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, 28 P.3d 669 (Utah 2001). 
Five years later, in 2001, the Court heard SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, 
Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, 28 P.3d 669 (Utah 2001). Plaintiff SME asserted 
negligence-based claims against several defendants with whom SME was not in privity of 
contract. Id. ^} 31, 45. SME (like the HOA in this case) urged this Court not to apply 
the economic loss rule because it "is rooted in products liability law" and therefore 
should not be extended to other areas. Id. *{ 33. The Court countered, saying SME 
ignored "that the economic loss rule has been applied in other contexts," specifically in 
construction defect litigation, as in American Towers. Id. \ 34. Endorsing the language 
from five years earlier, the Court again held that "the rationales underlying the doctrine 
are particularly applicable in the construction setting . . . ." Id. % 35. The rule is fitting 
economic loss rule to preclude homebuyers from recovering from third parties under tort 
theories. 
13 
for the construction industry because when parties contract "to protect against potential 
economic liability, as is the case in the construction industry, contract principles override 
tort principles . . . and, thus, purely economic damages are not recoverable'" Id. % 42 
(citation and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). The Court embraced the 
economic loss rule and disallowed SME from recovering its economic losses in tort. Id. \ 
45. 
c. Snow Flower Homeownersy Ass 'n v. Snow Flower, Ltd., 2001 
UT App 207, 31 P.3d 576 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
Only two days after the Court released its opinion in SME, the court of appeals 
handed down its decision in Snow Flower Homeowners} Ass 'n v. Snow Flower, Ltd., 
2001 UT App 207, 31 P.3d 576 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). Snow Flower is another case 
strikingly similar to both American Towers and this case. In Snow Flower, the 
homeowners' association brought a negligence claim against the developer of some 
condominiums. Id. ^ 9. The trial court dismissed the negligence claim ;;in accordance 
with the economic loss rule as enunciated by the supreme court in American Towers 
In SME, the Court also recognized several other jurisdictions that have held that 
relief for "defeated economic expectations under a design or construction contract" must 
come "from the contract itself, not from third parties.v all of which remain good law. Id. 
% 35. See, e.g., Fleischer v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 832. 837 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting contractor's negligence claim against architect under 
economic loss rule); Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Cmty. Gen. Hosp. Ann s, 
560 N.E.2d 206, 212 (Ohio 1990) (same); Bernard Johnson, Inc. v. Continental 
Consftuctors, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 365, 374 (Tex. App. 1982) (same); Blake Constr. Co. v. 
Alley, 353 S.E.2d 724. 727 (Va. 1987) (same); Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle 
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986, 992 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (same); Rissler & McMurry 
Co. v. Sheridan Area Water Supply Joint Powers Bd, 929 P.2d 1228, 1235 (Wyo. 1996) 
(same). 
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. . . ." Id. % 10. On appeal, the court found that the association "failed to demonstrate that 
the express reasoning set forth in American Towers [did] not apply to [the] developers." 
Id. \ 13. Indeed, in American Towers, the Court affirmed the grants of summary 
judgment to several defendants "without distinguishing the claims against the builders 
and developers/' Id. Therefore, the economic loss rule espoused in American Towers 
"was specifically applied to developers and the trial court properly applied the economic 
loss rule." Id. 
d. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, 48 P.3d 235 (Utah 2002). 
A year later, the Court tackled Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, 48 P.3d 235 
(Utah 2002). The HO A relied on Hermansen in this case for its proposition that the 
economic loss rule has eroded and is no longer good law in Utah. But with Hermansen, 
the Court simply carved out a narrow exemption—outside the construction defect 
context—for real estate brokers and agents, which was an issue of first impression in 
Utah. The Court did not abolish the rule or evidence any intent to shy away from 
applying it to construction defect cases like American Towers or Snow Flower. 
Hermansen is not a construction defect case; it deals with the duties a real estate 
professional owes a buyer and seller. Therefore, Hermansen does not represent an 
erosion of the economic loss rule, and it is distinguishable from this case (as well as from 
American Towers and Snow Flower). 
The facts of Hermansen are simple. The plaintiffs entered into an agreement with 
a contractor to build the plaintiffs a home. Id. ^2. The developer engaged defendant 
Tasulis to act as the listing broker, with Terena McDougal acting as the listing agent. Id. 
15 
T[ 3. The contractor, the broker, and the agent became aware of significant problems with 
the soil and subsurface conditions in the subdivision where the home was being built. Id. 
% 5. But they never disclosed this material information to the Hermansens. Id. ^ 5, 23. 
Ultimately, the Hermansens* home settled 3.75 inches, causing substantial structural 
damage. Id. f 5. The Hermansens asserted (among others) a negligence claim against the 
broker and the agent, but the trial court dismissed it, citing American Towers and the 
economic loss rule. Id. ^ 9. 
On appeal, this Court specifically addressed and distinguished American Towers 
from Hermansen. In American Towers, the Court reasoned, the plaintiff was not a direct 
party to any of the construction contracts with the defendants, and therefore, the success 
of the plaintiffs action depended upon whether it was an intended third-party 
beneficiary. Id. % 11. In contrast, Hermansen did not present the Court with a third-party 
beneficiary scenario. Id. \ 12. Rather, the parties to the appeal—the Hermansens, the 
broker, and the agent—dealt directly with one another. Id. f^ 12. Therefore, the Court 
could distinguish American Towers, making the issue in Hermansen "whether any duties 
or contractual relationship existed, the breach of which would entitle the Hermansens to a 
remedy." Id. ^ 12. 
The Court went on to examine the then-current status of the economic loss rule in 
Utah. It recognized that in SME. the Court "traced the product liability roots of the .. . 
rule articulated in American Towers, and reiterated its application to limit certain types 
of claims . . . ." Id^\3 (emphasis added). The Court also restated and endorsed the 
familiar refrain that the rule is "'particularly applicable in the construction setting.'" Id. ^ 
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13 (quoting SME, 2001 UT 54, ^ f 35). But the economic loss rule would not bar a tort 
claim if there was a duty "independent of any contractual obligations between the 
parties/' Id. Tj 17. 
According to the Court. Hermansen was distinguishable from American Towers 
and SME because in Hermansen, the Court was not "faced with third-party beneficiaries 
or a suit by a buyer against a seller where all respective rights of the parties are 
negotiated and risk appropriately designated in a written instrument/' Id. % 14. Rather, 
the relationship at issue was a ''direct relationship between buyers, a real estate broker, 
and his agent who allegedly failed to properly discharge their professional duties."' Id. ^ 
14. 
Grounded in that distinction, the Court analyzed whether a real estate broker and 
agent owed independent duties to homebuyers. Id. ^} 18-23. The Court concluded that a 
real estate broker and agent owe homebuyers a "duty to be honest, ethical, and 
competent/' thus exempting them from the protection of the economic loss rule. Id. ^ 23. 
e. Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, 70 P.3d 1 
(Utah 2003). 
A year after Hermansen. the Court addressed the economic loss rule again in 
Grynberg v. Ouestar Pipeline Co.. 2003 UT 8, 70 P.3d 1 (Utah 2003). Like Hermansen, 
though, Grynberg is not a construction defect case. Moreover, Wyoming law governed 
the contracts at issue in the case, so the Court applied Wyoming substantive law to its 
analysis of the economic loss rule. Id. Yd 40-53. Even so, the Court discussed American 
Towers, and the economic loss rule, with approbation. Id. T^ 49. In fact the Court 
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ultimately applied the rule to bar the Grynbergs' tort claims. Id. % 53. Then—solely in 
recognition of the narrow exception the Court created in Hermansen—the Court stated in 
dictum that it did not find American Towers "persuasive authority regarding the current 
state of the economic loss rule in Wyoming or Utah/' Id. ^ 49. 
The HOA put much stock into this dictum from Grynberg. But after viewing the 
statement in context with the paragraph it comes from, it becomes clear that the Court 
was merely acknowledging the slight evolution of the economic loss rule since first 
pronounced in American Towers, specifically, on two points: first, the adoption of the 
independent duty for real estate brokers and agents in Hermansen (a non-construction 
defects case); and second, the adoption of the maxim from the Colorado Supreme Court 
that "the initial inquiry in cases where the line between contract and tort blurs is whether 
a duty exists independent of any contractual obligations between the parties." Id. \ 49 
(citation and quotations omitted). The Court adopted these two modifications to the 
economic loss rule after American Towers, so it made sense for the Court to explain that 
based on Hermansen, the wholesale rule pronounced in American Towers had slightly 
changed.9 
9
 In West v. Inter-Financial, Inc.. 2006 UT App 222, 139 P.3d 1059 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2006), the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that Hermansen slightly altered the 
landscape of the economic loss rule. The court stated that until Hermansen, "the Utah 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the economic loss rule developed in the context of 
either products liability or construction and design." Id. *f 8. Hermansen gave this Court 
its "first opportunity since American Towers to address the . . . rule as it applied to 
professional who were not engaged in construction or design/* Id. % 14. The court of 
appeals correctly distinguished American Towers from Hermansen. which distinction 
does not apply in this case, since it is congruous with American Towers. 
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Additionally, the fact that the Court applied the economic loss rule to bar the 
Grynbergs' tort claims contradicts the HOA's arguments that Grynberg eroded the 
economic loss rule and that the rule is no longer good law. Given Grynberg" s outcome. 
the inverse is true: the economic loss rule is alive and well in Utah. 
f. Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291, 77 P.3d 339 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2003). 
The same year as Grynberg, the court of appeals issued an opinion in another case 
involving the economic loss rule. Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291. 77 P.3d 339 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2003). In that case, Fennell purchased a home from defendant Ivor}7 North. Id. 
Tl 3. A landslide occurred that damaged the home's landscaping. Id. ^ 3 . Fennell brought 
a negligent misrepresentation claim against the developer, with whom Fennell was not in 
privity. Id. fflf 3-4. The trial court granted the developers' summary judgment motion 
based on the economic loss rule as stated in American Towers and SME. 
Fennell appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's reliance on the 
economic loss rule in granting summary judgment to the developers. Id. f^ 13. 
Importantly, in footnote 7 of the opinion, the court noted the two recent cases from this 
Court, Grynberg and Hermansen, that had interpreted the economic loss rule. Id. ^ 15 
n.7. But the court concluded that those cases were "not applicable here and [could] be 
distinguished/* Id. % 15 n.7. As to Grynberg, the court of appeals recognized that it 
interpreted "Wyoming law and its economic loss rule.'* Id. % 15 n.7. And as to 
Hermansen, "the defendants had an independent duty to plaintiffs as real estate 
professionals," which independent duty was not present in Fennell Id.%\5 n.7. 
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Therefore, the economic loss rule correctly barred Fennell from recovering 
economic losses from the developers. Id. ^ 15. 
g. West v. Inter-Financial, Inc., 2006 UT App 222, 139 P.3d 
1059 (Utah Ct.App. 2006). 
The last case of the seven is West v. Inter-Financial Inc., 2006 UT App 222, 139 
P.3d 1059 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). In West, a home seller contracted with the defendant, 
Inter-Financial, Inc., to conduct an appraisal. Id. ^ 2. The homebuyers, the Wests, 
purchased the home in reliance on the appraisal. Id. % 2. The Wests later discovered that 
the appraisal overstated the square footage of the home by 560 square feet, or 18% of the 
home's total size. Id. \ 3. The Wests sued Inter-Financial for negligence and negligent 
misrepresentation, among others. Id. f^ 3. The trial court granted Inter-Financial's 
motion for summary judgment based on the economic loss rule. Id. % 3. The Wests 
appealed. Id. ^4. 
On appeal, the court deferred to American Towers and its progeny. Id. <jft[ 5-18. 
But the court evaluated Hermansen and concluded that a real estate appraiser is "more 
similar to real estate brokers, accountants, or surveyors, than to construction or design 
professionals." Id. f 20. Therefore, the court held that "real estate appraisers may be 
liable to third parties for economic damages as a matter of law." Id. % 20. 
West is clearly distinguishable from this case, given that the court of appeals was 
simply following this Court's lead in analogizing real estate appraisers to real estate 
brokers and agents, which is a logical and reasonable extension of Hermansen. 
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Far from the HOA's allegation, these seven cases show that the Utah Court of 
Appeals and Utah Supreme Court have continued to endorse and apply the economic loss 
rule, particularly in the construction defect context. Admittedly, Hermansen and West 
have slightly modified the rule. But American Towers still reigns, especially in this case 
with facts so similar to those in American Towers. 
3. Colorado's jurisprudence and legislation on the economic loss 
rule is a "photographic negative" of Utah's, rendering 
Colorado's law of little value in Utah. 
The HOA overstates this Court's endorsement and adoption of the Colorado 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the economic loss rule. Relying on Hermansen, the 
HOA states that this Court has ''abandoned the economic loss rule" from American 
Towers by adopting Colorado's interpretation. (Appellant's Br. 11-12, 30.) 
The HOA is mistaken. Rather, in Hermansen, the Utah Supreme Court merely 
adopted a general principle from Colorado, the 'initial inquiry" analysis, which is the 
rationale that if a party has an independent duty, outside of a contract, the economic loss 
rule will not bar a tort claim. Hermansen, 2002 UT 52. % 17. This was the basis for the 
Court's decision in Hermansen. in which the Court created a narrow independent duty 
exception to the economic loss rule for real estate brokers and agents. 
Specifically, the Court adopted the following language from the Colorado 
Supreme Court: 
The proper focus in an analysis under the economic loss rule is on the 
source of the duties alleged to have been breached. Thus, our formulation 
of the economic loss rule is that a party suffering only economic loss from 
the breach of an express or implied contractual duty may not assert a tort 
claim for such a breach absent an independent duty of case under tort law. 
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Id ffif 16-17 (quoting Grynbergv. Agric. Tech, Inc., 10 P.3d 1267, 1269 (Colo. 2000)). 
Following this citation to Colorado's Grynberg case, this Court stated that it 
"expressly adopt[ed] this interpretation of the economic loss rule. Therefore, the initial 
inquiry . . . is whether a duty exists independent of any contractual obligations between 
the parties." Id. (emphasis added). The Court did not state that it wholesale adopted 
Colorado's application of the economic loss rule to construction defect cases, as the HO A 
implies. 
Although the Court adopted the "initial inquiry"' analysis from the Colorado 
Supreme Court, that court's cases concerning the economic loss rule are of limited use in 
Utah because Colorado's landscape of the rule is drastically different from Utah's. Just 
like Utah has its bellwether case on the economic loss rule—American Towers— 
Colorado has one, too: Cosmopolitan Homes v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983). In 
Cosmopolitan Homes, the Colorado Supreme Court held that "a negligence claim, not 
limited by privity of contract, may lie against a contractor [and] requires a builder to use 
reasonable care in the construction of a home . . . ." ' Id. at 1043. Colorado courts then 
applied Cosmopolitan Homes to their subsequent construction defects cases relied upon 
by the HO A in this case, including Town of Alma v. Azco Constr. Inc., 10 P. 3d 1256 
(Colo. 2000). and Park Rise Homeowners' Ass }n, Inc. v. Resource Constr. Co., 155 P.3d 
427 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). 
Just like American Towers dictated how Utah courts applied the economic loss 
rule. Cosmopolitan Homes dictated how Colorado courts applied the rule in that state— 
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only with opposite outcomes. With respect to the economic loss rule, the two states are 
photographic negatives of one another, having decided similar cases opposite of one 
another. This important difference makes Colorado's cases on the economic loss rule of 
limited value in Utah. 
Moreover, continuing the "negative" relationship between Colorado and Utah, in 
2001, the Colorado General Assembly took the opposite step that the Utah Legislature 
would take in 2008: it enacted the Construction Defect Action Reform Act ("Act"). The 
Act "preserve[d] adequate rights and remedies for property owners who bring and 
maintain [construction defect] actions." A.C Excavating v. Yacht Club IIHomeowners' 
Ass }n, Inc., 114 P.3d 862, 868 (Colo. 2005). Just like the Utah Legislature codified the 
American rowers-based economic loss rule in 2008, the Colorado General Assembly 
codified the Cosmopolitan Homes-based independent duty exception for builders and 
subcontractors in 2001. Or in the Colorado Supreme Court's words, with the Act, the 
Colorado General Assembly "recognized the independent duty of care upon builders and 
subcontractors as articulated in Cosmopolitan Homes . . . ." Id. at 868-69. 
Therefore, in spite of this Court's adoption of the "initial inquiry" analysis from 
Town of Alma, Colorado's jurisprudence on the economic loss rule—especially in the 
construction defect context—is of little application in Utah. 
B. Damage to "Other Property" does not Include the Development Itself. 
Next, the HOA defies the nearly universally accepted definition and understanding 
of "economic loss" by arguing that damage to the units themselves is not economic loss, 
but is damage to "other property," thereby allowing the HOA to recover. This Court (and 
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countless others) have consistently declined to embrace the HOA's understanding of 
"economic loss." This case should be no different. 
1. Definition of "economic loss" and "other property." 
There is little disagreement about the definition of "economic loss.'5 It is defined 
as 
[djamages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the 
defective product, or consequent loss of profits—without any claim of 
personal injury or damage to other property . . . as well as the diminution in 
the value of the product because it is inferior in quality and does not work 
for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold. 
Am. Towers, 930 P.2d at 1189 (citation and quotations omitted); see also Maack, 875 
P.2d at 580 (defining "economic loss*' as "damages for inadequate value, costs of repair 
and replacement of the defective product, or consequent loss of profits—without any 
claim of personal injury or damage to other property"). 
Utah courts have definitively resolved that the "other property" cannot be "the . . . 
complex itself that was constructed as an integrated unit under one general contract." 
Am. Towers, 930 P.2d at 1191. Rather, the "other property" must be property that is not a 
part of the bargained-for finished product. Id. For example, if a garage attached to one 
of the units collapsed on a homeowners car, the resulting damage would be to "other 
property"—i.e.. the car rather than the structure—and would fall outside of the economic 
loss rule. 
2. This Court has severely limited W.R.H. and has distinguished it 
from American Towers. 
The HOA points to W.R.H., Inc. v. Economy Builders Supply, 633 P.2d 42 (Utah 
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1981). to argue that '"physical damage to property is not 'purely economic/" 
(Appellant's Br. 18-19.) In W.R.H, a purchaser of siding sued the manufacturer when 
the siding delaminated after installation. Id. at 43. The plaintiff sued alleging negligent 
manufacture of the siding which resulted in damage. Id. The lead opinion1 concluded: 
4The statement that purely economic interests are not entitled to protection against mere 
negligence . . . is inapplicable in situations such as the present where the alleged 
defective manufacture results in the deterioration of the product." Id. at 44 (emphases 
added). 
The HO A blinds itself to Utah appellate courts repeatedly limiting, distinguishing, 
and refusing to extend W.R.H. to other areas, including construction defect cases. (And 
importantly. W.R.H. was decided fifteen years before American Towers.) Most notably, 
in American Towers, the Court highlighted the difference between it and W.R.H.: in 
American Towers, "the Association allege[d] negligent design and construction of 
improvements to real property, not the negligence manufacturing of a product." Am. 
Towers, 930 P.2d at 1190. The American Towers Court also recognized the limitation of 
W.R.H., saying that it "has not been followed in subsequent cases." Id. at 1189. Instead, 
"it has been distinguished as a case that addressed only the negligence manufacturing of a 
product." Id; see, e.g., Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279. 
1286 (Utah 1982) (limiting W.R.H. to negligent manufacturing of product); Maack, 875 
P.2d at 581 (W.R.H. "not controlling" because it involved ''negligent manufacture" of 
10
 Justice Maughan wrote the lead opinion, in which Justice Wilkins concurred. 
Justices Stewart and Crockett concurred in the result only. Justice Hall dissented from 
that portion of the lead opinion dealing with recovery for negligence. 
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product rather than "negligent construction" of building); Schafir, 879 P.2d at 1388 
(same). 
Moreover, only three years after W.R.K, this Court clarified that it has never 
blended tort and contract concepts to allow products liability for purely economic 
injuries. Perry v. Pioneer WJwlesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 217-18 n.3 (Utah 1984). 
So although the HO A correctly states that W.R.H. technically has not been 
overruled, the HOA is answering the wrong question. The correct question is whether 
W.R.H. is analogous or dispositive to this case. And the answer from this Court, time and 
again, has been "no." 
3. Homeowners purchased finished products, not the component 
parts. 
The HOA argues that it suffered damage to "other property" within the meaning of 
the economic loss rule because the damage extended to more that one owner's unit. 
(Appellant's Br. 20-27.) The homeowners' associations in American Towers and Snow 
Flower made the same argument, and this Court and the court of appeals rejected it in 
both cases. 
In this case (just like in American Towers and Snow Flower), the HOA seeks 
recovery for damage caused by "defects in the original construction," but because the 
HOA "does not claim the defects caused physical damage to other property or bodily 
injury," the economic loss rule precludes recovery. Snow Flower, 2001 UT App 207, ^  
11 (emphases added). The homeowners bargained for and purchased finished products, 
not their component parts. The units were sold as part of a whole, of something bigger. 
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Just as this Court held in American Towers, the ''deterioration of the complex does not 
qualify for the 'damage to other property' exception to the economic loss doctrine." Am. 
Towers, 930 P.2d at 1191. Therefore, the HOA cannot recover economic losses from 
Davencourt. Woolstenhulme. and Parry Construction. 
4. "Other property" is not determined by different ownership. 
The HOA argues that because each unit is owed by a different homeowner, the 
damage need only affect, in theory, at least two homeowners to constitute damage to 
"other property/" based on the disparate ownership. (Appellant's Br. 26.) But the "other 
property" exception in the economic loss rule is not determined by ownership, which is 
irrelevant. Rather, the "'property' [is] the entire complex itself"that was constructed as an 
integrated unit under one general contract." Am. Towers, 930 P.2d at 1191 (emphasis 
added). 
Thus, for purposes of the "other property" analysis, it does not matter whether 
different parties own the damaged property at issue; disparate ownership cannot satisfy 
the "other property" exception to the rule. 
5. The economic loss rule does not apply to negligence claims 
generally. 
The HOA misunderstands the economic loss rule by analogizing the damage in 
this case to "[d]amage to a car in a car crash" and "damage to a home caused by a fire." 
(Appellant's Br. 25.) In both of those situations, if the plaintiff asserted a negligence 
cause of action against the defendant, the economic loss rule would not bar recovery 
because the rule does not apply in those contexts. Rather, the rule applies in products 
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liability and construction defect cases. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has found the 
rule ''particularly applicable to claims of negligent construction" because construction 
projects "are characterized by detailed and comprehensive contracts that form the 
foundation of the industry's operations." Am. Towers, 930 P.2d at 1190 (emphasis 
added); see also SME, 2001 UT 54. j^ 35 (citing the language from American Towers). 
Therefore, the HOA's analogy fails. 
C Davencourt Woolstenhulme. and Parry Construction Owe no Independent 
Duties to the HOA. 
The HOA argues that even if it has not suffered "property damage/9 the economic 
loss rule still does not apply because Davencourt, Woolstenhulme, and Parry 
Construction owed the HOA independent duties.11 (Appellant's Br. 27-37.) To bolster 
its argument, the HOA relies primarily on four Utah cases (and a host of Colorado cases 
that do not apply, see Section I.A.3, supra): Hermansen, West, Yazd, and Smith. Those 
cases do not instruct the analysis in this case because they are easily distinguishable. 
Moreover, none of those cases overruled American Towers or West, which are both 
nearly identical to this case. Therefore, Appellees did not owe the HOA any independent 
duties. 
Throughout its brief, the HOA trumpets Hermansen, arguing it eviscerated the 
economic loss rule by creating a host of independent duties. This grossly overstates 
Hermansen. In that case, the Court created a finite, narrow exception to the rule for real 
11
 One of the duties the HOA alleges Appellees owe is that of a fiduciary. 
(Appellant's Br. 32-37.) But the HOA already has a breach of fiduciary duty cause of 
action that survived Appellees' motion to dismiss. (R. at 173-74.) 
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estate brokers and agents. Moreover, that exception is based on a 1986 case, Secor v. 
Knight, 716 P.2d 790 (Utah 1986), which, years before Hermansen, had already held that 
real estate professionals have duties to homebuyers. Specifically, the Court stated that 
real estate professionals must "deal fairly and honestly" and that they have a "duty to 
disclose accurate [and] complete information . . . to protect the buyer from the unethical 
broker and seller and to insure that the buyer is provided sufficient accurate information 
to make an informed decision whether to purchase." Id. at 795 n.l (citation and 
quotations omitted). A homebuyer could incur "substantial injury" from "misplaced 
reliance on a broker," who holds himself out "as having particular skills and knowledge 
is the real estate field." Id. (citation and quotations omitted). Therefore, the broker "is 
under a duty to disclose facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property 
that are known to him . . . ." Id. (citation and quotations omitted). 
Thus, the Court's holding in Hermansen is nothing more than harmonizing 
existing law establishing the duties of real estate professionals {Secor) with the economic 
loss rule {American Towers). That is the only basis for the discrete exception to the 
economic loss rule established by the Court in Hermansen. 
West is even easier to distinguish. It is a logical and reasonable extension of the 
independent duty for real estate professionals this Court established in Hermansen. In 
West the court of appeals was faced with whether a real estate appraiser owed an 
independent duty to a homebuyer. The court evaluated American Towers, but concluded 
that "[t]he rationale for applying the economic loss rule as described in Utah case law is 
not present [in West]." West, 2006 UT App, |^ 21. The court of appeals reasoned that the 
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supreme court "applied the economic loss rule "in design and construction contexts 
because of the ability of parties to allocate risk by contract." Id. f^ 21 (citations omitted). 
In American Towers and Fennell, the plaintiffs had no contractual relationship with the 
defendants (exactly like the HOA in this case), "yet in both situations, the supreme court 
found that the plaintiffs could have avoided their economic loss with contracts." Id. 
(emphasis in original). 
In contrast, a "contractual relationship between the plaintiff and real estate 
professionals in Hermansen is inapposite due to their direct relationship . . . ." Id. Thus, 
the court found that West was similar to Hermansen because the defendant real estate 
appraiser "could have had a direct relationship with buyers of the appraised property." 
Id. T{ 22. Appraisers "are similar to real estate brokers and agents," and therefore, they 
have an independent duty to those with whom they have no contractual relationship. Id. % 
24. 
The Hermansen and West cases do not inform this case. They are based on 
preexisting precedent concerning real estate professionals' duties to homebuyers. 
Equally important, they do not erode or call into question the application of American 
Towers to this case, which is almost factually identical. 
The HOA also cited Yazdv. Yousefu 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283 (Utah 2006), and 
Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919 (Utah 2004), to urge this Court to create 
independent duties that Davencourt Woolstenhulme, and Parry Construction would owe 
to the HOA. Those cases do not support the HOA's argument. 
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Smith (which does not address the economic loss rule) actually works against the 
HOA. The plaintiff-homebuyer brought negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and 
fraudulent concealment claims against a remote third-party developer with whom Smith 
was not in privity of contract (similar to the HOA and Appellees in this case). Smith. 
2004 UT 55, % 9. The Court held that "the duties owed by contractors and developers are 
not without limitation." Id. \ 17. The Court concluded that the developer did not owe a 
duty of care to the ultimate homebuyers. Id. ^28. 
Yazd is one step removed from Smith. In Yazd, the plaintiffs brought a fraudulent 
concealment action (and no negligence claims) against a builder-developer with whom 
the plaintiffs had a contract to build a home. Yazd, 2006 UT 47, % 10. The builder-
developer knew about collapsible soils on the property, but failed to disclose that 
information to the plaintiffs. Id. % 6. This Court held that the builder-developer owed a 
duty to disclose known material defects based on the builder-developer's "direct" 
relationship with the plaintiff. Id. YH 25-26. In other words, the duty existed because of 
the ''relationship between the parties," id. ^35, which relationship is not present in this 
case. 
American Towers and its progeny clearly hold that Davencourt Woolstenhulme, 
and Parry Construction owed no independent duties to the HOA. Moreover, the 
'independent duty" cases cited by the HOA do not contradict or overrule the binding 
precedent that is American Towers, and they are distinguishable in any event. 
Davencourt and Woolstenhulme are developers. Parry Construction is a builder. They 
are not real estate brokers, agents, or appraisers, which are the only exceptions to the 
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economic loss rule. Therefore, the Court should decline to find an independent duty for 
Appellees, as the HOA urges. 
D. The Utah Legislature Recently Codified the Economic Loss Rule as 
Pronounced in American Towers. Evidencing the Public's Desire to Retain 
the Rule. 
In the 2008 General Session, after extensive input and debate, the Utah Legislature 
passed Senate Bill 220, "Cause of Action for Defective Construction,'" found at Utah 
Code Ann. sec. 78B-4--513. The new law codified the economic loss rule this Court 
established in American Towers, and it reflects the public desire, through their elected 
representatives, to retain the economic loss rule. 
The legislative branch "has the authority, and in many cases is better suited, to 
establish appropriate remedies for individual injuries." Spachnan v. Bd. of Ed. of Box 
Elder County Sch. Dist., 2000 UT 87, ^ 24, 16 P.3d 533, 539 (Utah 2000). Courts in 
Utah have an obligation to "defer to relevant legislative determination of appropriate 
remedies . . . . ' ' Id. That deference shows the courts' "respect [for] the legislature's 
important role in our constitutional system of government.5" Id. 
The Court should follow7 its own command and defer to the legislature's 
determination of good public policy. The legislature is generally better suited to make 
such determinations. 
The legislature understands that the economic loss rule is good policy. Departing 
from the economic loss rule in HOA-related construction defect cases would cause more 
harm than good. Even with the two limited exceptions to the rule in Hermansen and 
West the rule has been the law in Utah for over a decade. Myriad parties have relied 
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upon American Towers in creating business relationships, entering into contracts, and 
mitigating liabilities. Courts have also relied on the rule to make dispositive rulings 
affecting countless litigants. 
Overruling American Towers would throw the law of construction defect—and the 
economic loss rule—into chaos. It would subject builders to endless litigation and 
potentially limitless liability. On the other hand, the Court could use this opportunity to 
affirm the application of the economic loss rule in American Towers-Xy$t cases and 
clarify the rule generally. 
Moreover, given the legislature's action, one wonders what the effect of a reversal 
of the trial court in this case would have in terms of precedential value. It would affect 
this case, no doubt, but in light of the recent codification, it would thrust construction 
defect litigation into a black hole. 
The best, most cost-effective way to mitigate against defects in construction in an 
association-managed, multi-unit development is for the developer to assign its contractual 
rights with the builder to the HOA at the same time the developer turns over the 
development to the HOA. And the legislature specifically provided for this type of 
assignment in Utah Code Add. sec. 78B-4-513(6): "[njothing in this section precludes a 
person from assigning a right under a contract to another person, including to a 
subsequent owner or a homeowners[*] association/* Thus, if a developer desires (or if a 
members of an association demand), the developer can assign its contractual rights with 
the builder to the association, and the association then has a remedy in contract, leaving 
the law of contract and law of tort separate and in tact. 
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The relationship between a builder and a buyer of a high-density, association-
managed unit is unique. For example, as this Court said in American Towers, "[a] 
developer can contract for low-grade materials that meet only minimum requirements of 
the building code." Am. Towers, 930 P.2d at 1190. After the developer sells those units, 
ua buyer should not be able to turn around and sue the builder for the poor quality of 
construction" because the buyer received what he or she paid for, or he or she can bring a 
contract claim against the seller. Id. 
Further, the buyer of the association-managed unit can "avoid economic loss" by 
obtaining an inspection of the unit and property before the purchase. Id. Then, the buyer 
can uobtain[] insurance or . . . negotiat[e] a warranty or reduction in price to reflect the 
risk of hidden defects" and to mitigate against the untimely deterioration of low-grade 
materials. Id. at 1190-91. Additionally, a buyer could obtain a third-party warranty to 
protect against unknown defects. 
The "policy reasons supporting the economic loss rule are sound," reasoned the 
Court. Am. Towers, 930 P.2d at 1190. The legislature agreed, and the new law codified 
by the legislature is good public policy and is consistent with this Court's decision in 
American Towers. The new law merely established what this Court already pronounced 
twelve years ago, and the Court should defer to the electorate's desire to retain the 
economic loss rule. 
E. The HO A has not met its "Substantial Burden of Persuasion'^ to Justify 
Overturning American Towers. 
The doctrine of stare decisis imposes a heavy burden on the HOA in convincing 
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this Court that it wrongly decided American Towers. Repeatedly, the Court has 
admonished that "those asking us to overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden of 
persuasion." Laney v Fairview City, 2002 UT 79. \ 45, 57 P.3d 1007 (Utah 2002) 
(citations and quotations omitted). The Court will overturn precedent only if "'clearly 
convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of 
changing conditions and that more good than harm w ill come by departing from 
precedent." Id 
The doctrine of stare decisis, "under which the first decision by a court on a 
particular question of law governs later decisions by the same court." is a ''cornerstone of 
Anglo-American jurisprudence that is crucial to the predictability of the law and the 
fairness of adjudication." State v Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256. 1269 (Utah 1993) (citation 
omitted). It permits citizens to presume "that bedrock principles are founded in the law 
rather than in the proclivities of individuals . . . ." District of Columbia v Heller. 128 
S. Ct. 2783, 2824 n.4 (2008) (citation and quotations omitted). Although not an 
"inexorable command." the "careful observer will discern that any detours from the 
straight path of stare decisis . . . have occurred for articulable reasons . . . Id 
Particularly in a public policy arena, especially where the legislature has already 
spoken to the issue (which is the case here), the Court should defer to the legislature's 
debate, research, and decision to enact a piece of legislation. Courts, unlike legislatures. 
" Justice White remarked that "[t]he fundamental conception of a judicial body is 
that of one hedged about by precedents which are binding on the court w ithout regard to 
the personality of its members." Pollock v Farmers' Loan & Trust Co . 157 U.S. 429. 
652 (1895) (White. J.; dissenting). 
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are "unable to fully investigate the ramifications of social policies . . . ." Jones v. Barlow, 
2007 UT 20, Tj 36, 154 P.3d 808 (Utah 2007). Moreover, courts "are not agile in 
developing social policy. If we miscalculate in legislating social policy, the harm may 
not be corrected until an appropriate case wends its way through the system and arrives 
before us once against—a process that may take years or even decades." Id. 
In this case, the HOA has failed to meet its substantial burden. The HOA is not 
asking this Court to create an exception to the economic loss rule, as the Court did in 
dissimilar cases like Hermansen or as the court of appeals did in West. Rather, the HOA 
is asking the Court to wholesale overturn American Towers and the fundamental 
application of the economic loss rule to construction defect cases, justifications for w7hich 
this Court found convincing in 1996. 
The HOA points to cases like Yazdv. Yousefu 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283 (Utah 
2006), and Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919 (Utah 2004) (r. at 27-32), to 
argue that the economic loss rule has eroded in Utah, presumably to rationalize 
discarding stare decisis and reversing American Towers. But those are fraudulent non-
disclosure cases which do not deal with the economic loss rule in any way. And as 
discussed above, the HOA's reliance on Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, 48 P.3d 
23 5(Utah 2002), is similarly misplaced because in that (non-construction defect) case, the 
parties dealt directly with one another, which distinguishes it from American Towers and 
this case. 
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Equally important, in 2008, the Utah Legislature codified the rule after extensive 
debate and input from senators, representatives, and the public. See, e.g., the floor audio 
debates for Senate Bill 220, available at http://le.utah.gov/jsp/jdisplay/billaudio.jsp?sess= 
2008GS&bill=sb0220s01&Headers=true. The Court cannot ignore the effect of 
legislature's imprimatur on this doctrine. 
The HOA cannot show that the rule promulgated in American Towers was 
erroneous. Nor can it show that it is no longer sound based on changing conditions and 
continuing to rely on it would cause more harm than good. The "changing conditions'* 
actually cut against the HOA, given the legislature's recent action. Therefore, the Court 
should honor stare decisis. 
IL THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE HOA'S BREACH 
OF CONTRACT AND EXPRESS WARRANTY CLAIMS. THE MERGER 
DOCTRINE BARS CLAIMS THAT ARISE OUT OF CONTRACTS THAT 
HAVE MERGED WITH A WARRANTY DEED. 
Antecedent agreements merge into a final warranty deed conveyed from seller to 
buyer at closing. Therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed the HOA's breach of 
contract and express warranty claims. 
A. Any Express Warranties or Contractual Obligation that were not Included 
in the Deed were Extinguished Because thev were not Collateral to the 
Deed. 
The merger doctrine provides that "when a deed is given in full execution of a 
contract of sale of land, all provisions of the prior contract are merged therein." 
Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d 50, 53 (Utah 1978). Requiring that the deed represent the 
full agreement "preserves the integrity of the final document of conveyance and 
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encourages the diligence of the parties." Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 795 (Utah 1986); 
see also Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 322 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (stating 
that "[a] deed is the final repository of the agreement which led to its execution"). 
Additionally, the doctrine requires that both parties "make certain their agreements have 
in fact been fully included in the final document." Id. 
There are exception to the merger doctrine, "including fraud, mistake, and the 
existence of collateral rights in the contract of sale." Id. at 793. If one of these 
exceptions applies to a representation that was not expressed in the deed, it survives and 
does not merge with the deed. Id. 
To determine whether a collateral right exists, matters in an antecedent contract 
are not collateral to the final warranty deed if "they related to the same subject matter as 
the deed." Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, Tj 16, 44 P.3d 742 (Utah 2002); see also 
Dobrusky v. Isbell, 740 P.2d 1325, 1326 (Utah 1987) (stating that a deed controls 
"[w]hen the terms of the deed cover the same subject matter as the antecedent 
agreement"). Collateral rights are those that ~are not necessarily appurtenant to the lots, 
but are separate rights, distinct from the subject matter of the deed." Id.; see also Dansie 
v. Hi-Country Estates H.O.A., 1999 UT 62. ^ 21, 987 P.2d 30 (Utah 1999) (refusing to 
impose HOA membership on a subsequent owner because membership requirements for 
a homeowners association are not collateral and "without express language imposing the 
membership requirement in the later deeds, the requirement in the contract merged with 
the later deeds, and [was] extinguished"); Secor, 716 P.2d at 793 (stating that "covenants 
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relating to title and encumbrances are not considered to be collateral because they relate 
to the same subject matter as does the deed"). 
In this case. Appellee's delivery of the deed was full performance of its 
obligations. The terms of the deed covered the same subject matter as the antecedent 
agreements, especially because the deeds in this case conveyed an ownership interest in a 
specific portion of a constructed condominium, rather than a parcel of property with an 
edifice constructed upon it. The deed focused specifically upon each owner's portion of 
a condominium structure, and, therefore the building itself was the subject of the deed. 
Thus, no warranties or other representations regarding the building that were not included 
in the deed can survive as collateral rights because, upon execution of the deed, the real 
estate purchase contract and any other related documents merged into the deed. 
Based upon this, the trial court correctly found that "for such warranties that are 
not included in the deed to be enforceable they must be collateral to the delivery of the 
deed" and that Appellant's claims i;do not qualify for this exception." (R. at 173.) These 
warranties were not distinct from the subject matter of the deed and therefore merged 
with the deed. 
B. The Purchase Contracts are not Severable from the Recorded CC&Rs 
because the CC&Rs were Included in the Deed. 
Purchase contracts are not severable from recorded CC&Rs because CC&Rs 
"relate to the same subject matter as does the deed." Dansie, 1999 UT 62, f 21. In fact, 
CC&Rs rely upon their inclusion in a deed to survive. Id. If CC&Rs are not 
incorporated into a deed, they merge with the deed and are extinguished. Id. This Court 
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recognized this principle in Secor, stating that "covenants relating to title and 
encumbrances are not considered to be collateral." Secor, 716 P.2d at 793. 
The HOA cited no case to buttress its claim that the purchase contracts were 
inseverable from the CC&Rs. And the case law that the HOA did include supports the 
position that the purchase contracts are irrelevant to the survival of CC&Rs. In Workman 
v. Brighton Properties, Inc., the CC&Rs at issue were expressly incorporated into the 
warranty deed. 1999 UT 30, % 9, 976 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1999). Finally, as mentioned 
above, Dansie stands for the proposition that CC&Rs are dependent upon inclusion in 
subsequent deeds to survive. Dansie, 1999 UT 62, j^ 21. 
The HOA failed to show any reason why the purchase contracts were necessary to 
the survival or legitimacy of the CC&Rs. Moreover, because the deed specifically 
included the CC&Rs in its habendum clause, it is the deed, and not any antecedent 
agreement that governs any warranties related to the CC&Rs. Any agreement antecedent 
to the deed that was not incorporated into the deed is irrelevant to the CC&Rs, and 
therefore, the HOA cannot rely on the CC&Rs to resuscitate agreements that were 
extinguished by the final warranty deed. 
The trial court correctly ruled that the purchase contract merged into the final 
warranty deed, and thus, the court was right to dismiss the HOA's express warranty and 
breach of contract claims. 
IIL TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE HOA'S IMPLIED 
WARRANTY CLAIMS BECAUSE NO SUCH WARRANTY EXISTS IN 
UTAH. 
The HOA's claim of a breach of implied warranty is based on an implied warranty 
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of habitability. But Utah does not recognize an implied warranty of habitability with the 
sale of residential property. Therefore, this court should affirm the trial court's dismissal 
of the HOA's implied warranty claim. 
The Utah Court of Appeals first established the principle in Maack v. Resource 
Design & Constr., Inc., in which that court explained that an implied warranty of 
habitability does not exist for residential buyers because they are able to bargain on an 
equal level with residential developers and builders. 875 P.2d 570, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
Later that same year, the court of appeals reaffirmed the principle in Schafir v. 
Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1389 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In that case, the court also stated 
that arguments regarding liability for latent defects are "essentially an implied warranty 
theory, which Utah has not adopted." Id. 
Based in substantial part on Maack and Schafir, Utah courts have consistently 
refused to recognize an implied warranty of habitability in the very context in which 
HOA's claims exist. In American Towers, this Court refused to recognize an implied 
warranty of habitability after a homeowners* association claimed that water damage to 
the building resulted from builder-fabricated joints that were incorrectly made, even 
though the joints were hidden, latent defects. 930 P.2d at 1193. 
Then, in 2001. the Utah Court of Appeals applied American Towers in Snow 
Flower Homeowners' Ass n v. Snow Flower, Ltd., 2001 UT App 207, % 1, 31 P.3d 576 
(Utah Ct. App. 2001). In that case, the homeowners* association alleged breaches of 
"implied warranty and an implied warranty of fitness," but the claims were 
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"indistinguishable from a claim for a breach of an implied warranty of habitability.*' Id. f 
28. The court of appeals refused to recognize an implied warranty claim for "alleged 
defects in the original construction"' of the condominiums. Id. 
Two years later, in 2003 the Utah Court of Appeals again refused to recognize a 
"breach of implied warranty" claim as anything other than an alleged "breach of implied 
warranty of habitability*' and again reaffirmed the principle that ua breach of an implied 
warranty of habitability has not been extended to purchasers of residential property/' 
Fennel! v. Green. 2003 UT App 291. *{ 16, 77 P.3d 339 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). And in 
2005, the court of appeals reiterated that an appellant's claim of an "implied warranty of 
fitness for a particular purpose"' failed "as a matter of law because Utah does not 
recognize an implied warranty of fitness in the context of purchasers of real property/' 
Amell v. Salt Lake Co. Bd of Adjustment. 2005 UT App 165, ffif 47-48, 112 P.3d 1214 
(Utah Ct. App. 2005). The court echoed what it had stated several years earlier in Snow 
Flower—that a claim for a breach of an implied warranty of fitness is no different from a 
claim for a breach of an implied w arranty of habitability. Id. *{\ 48. 
The HO A cites a twenty-five-year-old Florida case to support the claim that a 
majority of states recognize an implied warranty of habitability in the residential home 
context. (Appellant's Br. 42.) Even if that is still the case, this Court expressly rejected 
those courts* rationales in American Towers. In Conklin v Hurley, the case the HOA 
cited to demonstrate that Utah is in the minority, the Florida Supreme Court stated that 
w
'[t]he rationale of the cases which [recognize the implied warranty of habitability] is that 
the purchaser is not in an equal bargaining position with the builder-vendor of a new 
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dwelling." 428 So. 2d 654, 657-58 (Fla. 1983) (citation omitted). But this Court 
expressly rejected that position, stating that buyers and sellers of residential property 
"have similar bargaining power."13 Am. Towers, 930 P.2d at 1194. The HOA proffered 
no reason why this Court would be justified in rejecting clear, established Utah law in 
favor of a different approach that has already been rejected by this Court and relied upon 
by countless lower Utah courts. 
The HOA's reliance on Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919 (Utah 2004), 
to demonstrate a "trend" towards adopting the implied warranty of habitability in Utah is 
misplaced. (Appellant's Br. 42.) Smith centered on whether the original developer 
(which did not develop or construct the homes) could be held remotely liable to a home 
buyer when that buyer's home experienced settling. 2004 UT ^f 9-28. Ultimately, the 
Court held that a developer's "duty of care and disclosure extended only to its immediate 
transferees," not to remote purchasers. Id. Tj 28. The HOA took Smith and the Court's 
string citation in Smith out of context; they do not support a trend toward recognizing an 
implied warranty of habitability. 
Moreover, the HOA's cited cases are distinguishable and do not establish the 
existence of (or a trend towards) an implied warranty of habitability. In Taylor Nat., Inc. 
v. Jensen Bros. Const. Co., the Court decided the case on wholly unrelated procedural 
grounds and simply mentioned that the trial court's factual finding that one party owed 
~ The Court also reasoned that a buyer can mitigate against risk by "obtaining a 
thorough inspection," by "obtaining insurance," or by "negotiating a warranty or 
reduction in price to reflect the risk of hidden defects." Am. Towers, 930 P.2d at 1190-
91. 
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$2,000 to another party was not adequately addressed in the trial court's amended 
judgment. 641 P.2d 150, 155 (Utah 1982). In Tibbitts v. Openshaw, the Court simply 
repeated what the trial court stated about the possibility of an implied warranty, affirming 
the trial court's ruling based upon language from a properly merged and integrated 
contract. 425 P.2d 160, 161 (Utah 1967). Additionally, this Court decided both of these 
cases several 3;ears before Maack and American Towers. Any implications drawn from 
Taylor and Tibb have been eviscerated by Maack, Schafir, American Towers, and their 
progeny. 
Like its other arguments, the HOA's claim that its breach of implied warranty 
claim should survive because it qualifies as a breach of an implied warranty of 
workmanlike performance fails. The HO A claims that this implied warranty exists in 
Utah, but offers no Utah authority in support. Utah cases have mentioned this warranty 
precisely one time, and in that case, the Supreme Court ambivalently stated that "many 
courts have found a warranty of workmanlike performance implicit in a contract for 
sendees." Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah 1983).14 The Court then 
explicitly refused to decide the case on implied warranty grounds. Id. at 605. 
The HOA's original complaint alleged the following regarding implied warranties 
in constructing the condominiums: "[djeveloper breached its warranties by failing to 
provide Units and a project that were habitable and in excellent condition." (Compl. f 
79.) This allegation is, like the allegations in Snow Flower, a claim of "alleged defects in 
14
 This case involved a dispute between two contractors after one of the 
contractors made express promises regarding the capabilities of rope. Groen, 667 P.2d 
600-01. 
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the original construction o f the condominiums. 2001 UT App 207, j^ 1. And, just as in 
Snow Flower and Schafir, this allegation of latent defects is "indistinguishable from a 
claim for a breach of an implied warranty of habitability." Id. ^ 28. The HOA's 
argument "has failed to demonstrate that its implied warranty claims differ from a claim 
for breach of implied warranty of habitability," id. j^ 30. and therefore, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's dismissal of the HOA's implied warranty claim. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AMEND. 
A trial court has "full discretion to allow an amendment of the pleadings; that is. it 
may grant or deny a party's motion for amendment upon any reasonable basis.'* England 
v. HorbacL 944 P.2d 340, 345 (Utah 1997) (emphasis added). A trial court's decision 
;i[w]hether to grant or deny a motion to amend" will not be disturbed "unless the 
appealing party establishes an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice." Pride Stables 
v. Homestead Golf Club, Inc., 2003 UT App 411, % 11, 82 P.3d 198 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) 
(quotations omitted) (emphasis added). 
The HOA did not even attempt to establish that the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying the HOA's motion to amend. Rather, the HOA simply alleged that the trial 
court erred in refusing to allow it to amend its complaint. (Appellant's Br. 48.) Further, 
the HOA made no effort to show how it was prejudiced by the trial court's decision. 
Finally, a reasonable basis did exist for the trial court to deny the motion to amend, and, 
therefore, its decision should not be disturbed. 
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The trial court's analytical process and resulting decision were both reasonable. 
The court looked first to whether or not a duty was owed, and upon consideration of the 
relevant, precedential cases defining the scope of duty when subsurface soil problems are 
alleged, the court correctly found that none of these cases had identified the duty alleged 
by the HOA in its motion to amend. In its analysis, the trial court meticulously examined 
whether each of the named defendants owed a duty to the HOA under the principles 
established in Smith, Moore, and Yazd.15 The court's analysis followed this Court's 
requirement in both Smith and Yazd that the court determine 'the existence and scope of 
the duty owed the plaintiff by the defendant." Yazd, 2006 UT 47, \ 11. This process 
provided the trial court with a reasonable foundation upon which to base its decision. 
Based on this analysis, the trial court determined that "none of the Defendants had 
the necessary relationship with the Plaintiff to impose the duties created by Smith." R. at 
663. This was reasonable because, based on the holdings of Smith and Yazd, no 
relationships had been created that triggered any duty. In this case, the 
builder/contractor, who is "expected to be familiar with conditions in the subsurface of 
the ground," Smith, 2004 UT 55, ^ J19, never acted as a seller of the units, and, therefore, 
never had a duty to any of the unit buyers. 
Furthermore, the trial court noted that because none of the remaining defendants 
were developer/builders, as in Yazd, or builder/sellers, as in Moore, "no special or 
13
 The HOA based its motion to amend (filed on April 26, 2007) on "new case 
law" that would impact the case. (R. at 206-07.) Specifically, the HOA cited Smith, 
Hermansen. Grynberg, Yazd, and Moore. But these cases range from 2002 to 2007. 
hardly making them "new case law." 
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independent duties can be imposed on the Defendants in relation to the Plaintiff." (R. at 
664.) The trial court reasonably analyzed the duty principle based upon the premise in 
Smith that 'the duties owed by contractors and developers are not without limitation/' 
2004 UT 55, % 17, and refused to create a new duty that this Court has never recognized. 
The trial court also reasonably found that the HOA's new allegations did not 
revive the previously dismissed claims. Although the HO A claimed in its motion to 
amend that the Smith, Yazd, and Moore decisions eroded the "all-encompassing grasp" of 
the economic loss rule (r. at 207), the trial court recognized that the cases were unrelated 
to this case. The court reasonably reviewed Smith, Yazd, and Moore and understood that 
they dealt with independent duties between certain classes of builder/sellers and buyers 
rather than the scope of the economic loss rule. (R. at 664-65.) Therefore, when the 
HOA failed to demonstrate that an independent duty existed, the trial court found that 
those cases did not justify reopening the previously dismissed complaints. 
Although the HOA may dispute the scope of the specifically defined duties in 
Smith, Yazd, and Moore, the HOA failed to demonstrate that the trial court had no 
reasonable basis for its ruling, which is the applicable standard from England. And to the 
contrary, reasonable bases existed. Therefore, the trial court's decision to deny the 
HOA's motion to amend should not be disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Court's own words, it has "consistently emphasized the importance of the 
parties' right to negotiate the terms of a contract, limited only be statutory prohibitions or 
public policy." SME, 2001 UT 54, % 44. If the Court allowed the HOA to recover from 
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Davencourt, Woolstenhulme, and Parry Construction, "parties could essentially sidestep 
contractual duties by bringing a cause of action in tort to recover the very benefits there 
were unable to obtain in contractual negotiations." Id. \ 44. Thus, "to maintain the 
fundamental boundary between tort and contract law," this Court reaffirmed that "when 
parties have contracted, as in the construction industry, to protect against economic 
liability, contract principles override . . . tort principles . . . and, thus, economic losses are 
not recoverable." Id. \ 44. 
Admittedly, the HOA's position is difficult. As this Court recognized in American 
Towers, "[p]laintiff homeowners faced with losses that are not of their own making 
present[] a sympathetic case . . . ." Am. Towers, 930 P.2d at 1192 (citation and quotations 
omitted). But as the Court did in 1996, it "must exercise caution . . . that we do not 
unduly upset the law upon which expectations are built and business is conducted." Id. 
(citation and quotations omitted). 
If the Court allows the HOA to recover from Davencourt, Woolstenhulme, and 
Parry Construction, it will deeply blur the line between tort law and contract law, 
resulting in "liability in an indeterminate amount for an indetermination time to an 
indeterminate class." Id. at 1190. (citation and quotations omitted). The Court should 
not allow the HOA to impose their economic expectations "upon parties whom the 
[association] did not "know and with whim they did not deal and upon contracts to which 
they were not a party." Id. at 1191. 
The Court should honor stare decisis and uphold its decision in American Towers. 
Further, the Court should recognize and defer to the Utah Legislature's determination to 
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retain—and codify—the economic loss rule. An)thing less would massively disturb the 
doctrine that parties and courts have relied upon for more than a decade. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of August 2008. 
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